Ten years after the mortgage crisis, the U.S. housing market rebounded signicantly with house prices now near the peak achieved during the boom. Homeownership rates, on the other hand, continued to decline. We reconcile the two phenomena by documenting the rising presence of institutional investors in this market. Our analysis makes use of housing transaction data. By exploiting heterogeneity in zip codes' exposure to regulatory shocks that aected lenders dierently, changes in FHFA conforming loan limits, as well as capital gains tax rates, we establish the causal relationship between the increasing presence of institutions in the housing market and the subsequent recovery in house prices and decline in homeownership rates between 2007 and 2014. We identify housing rehabilitation/renovation as well as improvement in the local labor market as the main transmitting channels. We further demonstrate that institutional investors also contributed to the decline in the growth rates of the local rent-price-ratio and the increase in eviction rates in areas with either moderate housing supply elasticity or with high foreclosure rates.
households from buying without or with little credit. For foreclosed-upon borrowers, it takes at least three to ve years to qualify for a new mortgage after a foreclosure (Goodman, Zhu, and George 2014). This creates a buying opportunity for institutions with better access to nance. As these institutions enter into the housing market and turn their purchased properties into rentals, house prices begin to recover while homeownership rates continue to decline.
6
To investigate the extent to which institutional investors' presence aects local housing market, we conduct analysis using an instrumental variables approach to deal with the endogeneity concern, that is, institutional investors buy in areas where house prices are about to recover. We use several identication strategies that are tied closely to the driving factors discussed above. The rst instrument comes from Gete and Reher (2018) . Specically, we exploit the heterogeneity across zip codes in exposure to lenders which suered regulatory shocks following the Dodd-Frank Act, approved after the crisis. The rationale is that zip codes that had more exposure to lenders more aected by the passage of Dodd-Frank will suer more from tightened lending standards.
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The second instrument follows Loutskina and Strahan (2015) , which takes advantage of changes in conforming loan limits since 2008. Mortgages below the conforming limit benet from the guarantee of Government Sponsored Enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Prior to 2008, these limits were uniform and determined at the national level. After 2008, the Economic Stimulus Act revised the methodology so that the conforming limit is now tied to the cost of living in a given county. Our instrument intends to capture the heterogeneity in zip code exposure to changes in these limits by calculating the percentage of mortgage loan applications that had an amount in excess of 125 percent of the limit. The more mortgage loans that exceed 125 percent of the conforming limit, the less relevant regulations are. 8 Our third instrument explores variations in state capital gains taxation as in Gao, Sockin, and Wei (2018) . We calculate, at each zip code, the income tax rate for a household making average income and the rate the average household would be paying on its capital gains from housing investment. For states with no income tax, the number will be set at zero. The higher the tax rate, the less protable it is for investors with passthroughs such as LLCs to buy and sell properties, as prots from these transactions are counted as personal income.
9
Our main results can be summarized as follows, for the period between 2007 and 2014, the 6 Global capital inow as well as institutions chasing yields as a result of the lackluster bond market performance also contributed to the trend (Lambie-Hanson, Li, and Slonkosky 2018). 7 Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski and Seru (2018) use similar regulatory burden measures across space to study the impact on traditional lenders. They argue that shadow banks come in and ll some of the gap, however, these shadow banks typically charge higher prices. Gilchrist, Siemer and Zakrajsek (2018) also use similar identication strategies to study the real eects of changes in mortgage supply.
8 Grundl and Kim (2018) study the marginal eect of lowering government mortgage guarantees and nd that lowering the limit increased the government guarantee signicantly but homeownership rates modestly. 9 An implicit assumption here is that investors using LLCs would be residing in the same zip code of the property and hence on average having the zip code's income. According to the National Association of Realtors' 2014 Investment and Vacation Home Buyers Survey, 15 percent of the investment property is within 5 miles of the buyer's primary residence, 30 percent is within 10 miles, and the median is 20 miles. The land area of a zip code varies widely between less than 1 square mile to 13,431 square miles with a mean of 90 square miles. signicant rise in institutional buyers and the relatively little change in institutional sellers in the single-family residential market contributed to 12 percent of the increase in the real house price growth, and 30 percent of the decline in changes in homeownership rates. We further identify increased housing renovation and/or rehabilitation and improved local labor market as the main transmitting channels. Additionally, we nd that institutional buyers are also responsible for 13 percent of the decline in the growth rates of the local rent-to-price ratio. There is also some evidence that the presence of institutional buyers led to rises in eviction rates in areas with moderate housing supply elasticity or high foreclosure.
Our paper belongs to the small but growing literature that studies the dynamics of the post-crisis housing market. In particular, our paper complements that of Gete and Reher (2018) by showing that when mortgage supply contracts, this creates opportunities for institutional investors that have better access to credit than individual borrowers. These investors purchase residential properties and then often turn them into rental properties. In other words, these institutions are responsible for the rental increase in the post-crisis housing market studied in Gete and Reher (2018) . However, we point out that the presence of these institutional investors also help local house prices to recover when they participate in the market as buyers. As a result, areas in our sample actually experienced a decline in the growth in rent-price ratio due the presence of institutional investors. These results are consistent with prior case studies of investor activity that relied on interview evidence and narrower data analysis to argue that investors exerted a stabilizing force when house prices were declining (Lambie-Hanson, Herbert, Lew, and Sanchez-Moyano 2015). Note that these results stand in contrast to the role of investors during the boom leading to the house crisis, suggesting that the presence of investors vary importantly with the macroeconomic environment.
Our paper also complements those of Molloy and Zarutskie (2013), Lambie-Hanson, Herbert, Lew, and Sanchez-Moyano (2015), Mills, Molloy and Zarutskie (2017), and Allen, Rutherford, Rutherford and Yavas (2018), by studying a more representative sample of the nation and by focusing on the overall housing market, distressed as well as non-distressed. More importantly, our instrumental variable approach allows us to make a causal statement by linking tightened lending standards directly with the emergence of institutional investors as separate large asset holders.
Finally, we also investigate the impact of institutional presence on the local rental market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data used for our main analysis. In section 3, we present our empirical model and discuss main results of the paper as well as the robustness of our results along many dimensions. Section 4 analyzes the transmitting mechanisms as well as the impact on the local rental market. Section 5 concludes. we check, based on their market share, the top 20 buyers/sellers in each city each year and classify them accordingly. In the case that these buyers/sellers' names are not indicative, we search online for their information. The advantage of our approach is that it is straightforward and less prone to classication errors since institutions clearly buy single family houses for investment purposes.
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However, this approach does miss individual investors who purchased homes using their own names.
As a result, our measurement serves as a lower bound of true investor activity.
As an eort to further study the identities of the institutional investors, we adopt a top-down strategy. From the many industry reports, Amherst Capital Market Reports in particular, we gather the names of top 20 institutions that have bought in the single family housing market.
14 Large investors often buy properties under a variety of names. The way we identify purchaser names aliated with these large rms is to link together buyers that use the same mailing address. We manually inspect each buyer to conrm that it is, indeed, part of the larger company, rather than being erroneously linked as a result of sharing the same attorney, for example. homeownership rate began its steady fall. In 2014, it is only a touch above 60 percent. The movements of the homeownership rates were quite dierent across the four cities. Las Vegas had the greatest fall but started to recover in 2012. The homeownership rate moved within a much narrow range for Atlanta and Washington D.C. than for the other cities. New York City had an early rise in the homeownership rate, followed by a persistent decline.
In Table 1 Figure 5 ). Prior to the crisis, institutional sellers were mostly construction companies. They reduced new housing construction as the market headed to the crisis. All four MSAs had a run up in institutional sales during the crisis. However, most of the increase was due to the rise in foreclosure sales, which by denition have institutions as sellers.
Excluding the sales where banks are selling the properties they they foreclosured upon (which can be very dierent from institutions selling properties they bought previously), the share by institutional sellers moved up somewhat for New York City and Washington D.C., but fell slightly for Atlanta.
Las Vegas is the only one whose pattern for institutional sales in the nondistressed market followed somewhat that in the overall market. 
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Over our sample period, these large institutions have also increased their presence both as buyers and as sellers in single-family housing, but only in selected markets. As buyers, they are most active in Charlotte, Miami, Atlanta, and Tampa MSAs, more so in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Diego. Additionally, depending on the cities, they were either more active in the regular market or the foreclosure market. rate of the real average income was nearly zero during this period.
Estimation Strategy
Our baseline specication explores the panel nature of our dataset and is described as follows,
where i indexes zip code and t year; y i,t is the dependent variable, which for the benchmark case is the real zip code level house price growth rate and changes in homeownership rate; of the explanatory variables on the right-hand-side of the equation, x 1 i,t represents the share of institutional buyers at zip code i and in year t; x 2 i,t represents the share of institutional sellers at zip code i and in year t;
z i,t−1 includes all other control variables including the one-period lagged total population growth, changes in unemployment rate and foreclosure rate, growth in real average household income as well as MSA and time xed eects.
20 The variables of interests are β 1 and β 2 as they measure the separate eects of institutional buyers and sellers on the local market.
If we estimate equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), our estimates will be biased because common shocks can drive both house price dynamics, homeownership rates as well as institutional investors' participation in the local housing market. For instance, a large fraction of institutional investors in the local housing market may be a response to local economic conditions rather than a cause of the housing and economic cycles. To resolve this identication issue, we use a Two-Stage least squares (2SLS) for the regression analysis, an extension of the ordinary least squares (OLS). Specically, in the rst stage we estimate
where q j i,t are the instrumental variables that are related to x j i,t but unrelated to the error term i,t in equation (2).
Instruments
We construct three instruments. As discussed in the introduction, our rst instrument captures zip codes' heterogeneous exposure to lenders subject to the Federal Reserve System's Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test after the crisis. These tests are meant to ensure that the largest bank holding companies have enough capital to weather a nancial crisis, but as a side-eect they have encouraged those institutions to tighten their standards in mortgage markets (Calem, Correa, and Lee 2016). Our methodology follows Gete and Reher (2018)'s construction of panel instrument, which in turn followed that of Khwaja and Mian (2008) . The Khwaja and 20 The large number of zip codes relative to sample size precludes us from using zip code xed eects.
Mian (2008) methodology extracts a measure of lenders' propensity to deny a loan that is purged of borrower, zip code, and time eects. The construction of the instrument takes two steps. In the rst step, we estimate a probability of loan denial using HMDA data controlling for a key variable, whether the loan was from a lender subject to the stress test in that particular year, as well as other control variables including borrowers' income, their requested loan-to-income ratio, borrowers' race, and zip code and time xed eects as described in equation (3), where i represents each loan, j zip code, t year, and l whether the lender is subject to the stress test. The coecient of the key variable, L t,l , which measures whether the loan was from a lender subject to the stress test that year, is our stress shock.
In the second step, we weight the coecient by the zip code mortgage application shares of these stress-test-aected lenders as of 2005, two years prior to our sample period, i.e.,
For more details on the construction of the instrument, see the appendix in Gete and Reher (2017).
In Figure 6 panel a, we chart the instrument averaging over the 20 cities and for four selected cities.
As can be seen, prior to 2008, banks that would have been subject to the stress test tended to have lower mortgage denial rates than lenders that would not be subject to the stress test. After 2008, however, these banks were denying mortgage applications at much higher rates than lenders not subject to the stress test. The dierences peaked in 2010. After a dip in 2011, they went back up to the level we saw in 2010.
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The construction of our second instrument follows that of Loutskina and Strahan (2015) . As mentioned in the introduction, lenders are more willing to lend conforming loans dened as loans confounding factor is the decline in local house prices that led to smaller mortgages needed for housing transactions. After 2011, we began to see a slow increase in the fraction of mortgage applications that have loans over and above 1.25 times the conforming limit.
Our third instrument follows Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2018). We construct at zip code level capital gains tax rate for a household with mean income. In other words, while the tax rate is set at the state level, the household mean income is at the zip code level. The primary residence exclusion allows homeowners to exclude up to $250,000 ($500,000 per couple) of capital gains from the sale of their primary residence, at both the federal and state levels, if the homeowners have owned and lived in the house for at least two of the ve years prior to the sale. There is, however, no capital gains exclusion for sales of non-owner-occupied homes, including those owned by institutional buyers.
Dierent states impose dierent capital gains tax rates, and some impose no capital gains tax at all.
More importantly, theses tax rates are not driven by shocks to the housing market. See Gao et al.
(2017) for more detailed discussion. Though our analysis focuses on institutional investors in the housing market, as we pointed out earlier, many of these institutions take the form of LLCs. LLCs are not taxed as a separate business entity. Instead, all prots and losses pass through the business to members of the LLC. LLC members pay federal as well as state income taxes on prots.
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In Table 2 under the heading of Instruments, we present summary statistics of our instruments.
On average, between 2007 and 2014, mortgage applications to banks subject to stress tests are more likely to be denied by 26 basis points with a median of 15 basis points. During the same period, the share of mortgage applications with loan amount exceeding 125 percent of the limit has a mean of 0.76 percent and a median of 0. The capital gains tax at mean income averages about 4.5 percent with a median of 4.8 percent.
Main Results
We present our benchmark estimation results using OLS as well as 2SLS estimation techniques in Table 3 . All analyses are weighted by the number of housing transactions in the zip code. As seen in the table, in the OLS analysis where no instruments are used, a one-percentage increase in the share of institutional buyers leads to an increase in real house price growth rates of 12 basis points, while a one-percentage point increase in the share of institutional sellers leads to a decrease of 6 basis points in real house price growth rates. For the other explanatory variables, a one-percentage point increase in past real HPI growth rate increases the current one by 30 basis points suggesting strong auto-regressive property in real house price appreciate rate. Areas that had high unemployment rates or high foreclosure rates in the previous period also had lower house price recovery. Lagged Table 4 . Shares of institutional buyers are negatively correlated with lagged zip code real house price growth, lagged zip code population growth, lagged changes in county unemployment rate, lagged changes in zip code foreclosure rate, as well as lagged growth rate of real average household income at the zip code level. The result that institutional buyers respond negatively to lagged house price growth rates is particularly interesting, as it contrasts with the individual investors' behavior during the housing room. According to Gao et al. (2017) , individual investors responded strongly and positively to lagged real house price growth rates, suggesting that they were forming their expectation of future house price movements from the recent experience, i.e., they are momentum traders. Our analysis here suggests the institutional investors during the housing recovery acted like contrarian, by targeting low-growth areas expecting a turn around in house prices in those areas.
Turning to selling activity, shares of institutional sellers are negatively correlated with lagged real house price growth rate, but positively correlated with lagged zip code population growth, and lagged changes in foreclosure as well as lagged changes in unemployment rates. All three instruments aect institutional purchases and institutional sales statistically signicantly. In particular, areas that had more exposure to banks subject to the stress test or with more loans far exceeding the conforming loan limit are more likely to have both more institutional buyers and sellers because in these areas households face greater diculty obtaining mortgages or cheaper mortgages to buy their residences. By contrast, a higher capital gains tax rate makes investment in housing more expensive, as a result, fewer institutions buy or sell.
To arrive at an estimate of the overall impact of institutional buyers and sellers on the local housing market, we time the average eect from these estimations with changes in institutional buyers and sellers, add the two eects together, and then divide by their mean during the period.
Specically, between 2007 and 2014, shares of institutional buyers went up by 6.54 percentage points while shares of institutional sellers went up by 6.7 basis points. The overall net eect is 1.3 percentage points for house price growth rates and negative 16.8 basis points for changes in homeownership rate, or 12 percent for changes in house price growth rates and 30 percent for changes in homeownership rates.
Robustness Analysis
We now conduct several robustness tests. First, we use alternative instruments. Then we conduct our analysis without the weights, i.e., we treat all zip codes the same and do not overweight large and active areas. For the third robustness analysis, we include REO sales where sellers are banks in our institutional sales measure. For the fourth, we study how the results vary with the housing supply elasticity as constructed by Saiz (2010). For the last experiment, we study how the eect of institutional buyers and sellers changes with the intensity of foreclosure sales in the area.
In our benchmark analysis, we used all three instruments for the two endogenous variables, the fraction of purchases by institutions and the fraction of sales by institutions. In theory, two instruments are suce for two endogenous variables. We, therefore, experiment with using two of the three in our rst robustness analysis and present the results in Table 5 . As can be seen, the results vary a bit for both house price growth rates and changes in homeownership rates, but the eects are statistically as well as economically signicant. For our second robustness check as reported in Table 6 , when we treat all zip codes equally instead of weighting large and active areas more heavily as in the benchmark analysis, the eects of institutional buying and selling on local house price growth and changes in homeownership rates remain both economically and statistically signicant and somewhat smaller than those obtained in the benchmark analysis for house price growth rates but larger than the benchmark results for changes in homeownership rate (Table 3) .
For the third where we use a broader measurement of institutional sales, the impact of institutional sales become a bit smaller but the impact of institutional purchases are largerly unchanged.
Turning to housing supply elasticity (Table 7) , interestingly, cities with medium range housing supply elasticity had the largest impact from the presence of institutions in the single family housing market both as buyers and as sellers. This result is consistent with the theoretical work in Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2017), where they demonstrate that when there exists information frictions where households cannot separate a housing supply shock from a demand shock, households and hence house prices will overreact in areas with intermediate supply elasticity. The intuition is straightforward, prices are fully revealing when supply is perfectly inelastic, and prices are completely uninformative about demand when supply is very elastic.
In terms of foreclosure intensity (Table 7) , in Figure 4 we have shown that institutional buyers are much more active in the distressed market than in the regular market. It is not surprising, therefore, that these institutions have the biggest impact in terms of both real house price growth rates and changes in homeownership rate, particularly for the presence of institutional sellers.
Transmitting Mechanisms and the Impact on the Rental Market
Having established a causal relationship between the increase in institutional activities in the singlefamily housing market and the recovery in the local house prices as well as the decline in homeownership rate, we now investigate the potential mechanisms through which these activities aect the local housing market. We will also investigate the impact on the rental market of the presence of institutional owners in the housing market.
Transmitting Mechanisms
There are several candidates for the transmitting mechanisms. First, institutional owners may engage in more housing rehabilitation, either because they have the nancial ability to do so or because they feel that they can better capture the investment returns via rental income stemming from better management, etc. We test this channel by studying how county-level building permits are impacted by the increasing presence of institutional buyers and sellers. Second, the increased institutional activities may help drive the local economy by creating more jobs and hence reducing local unemployment rates and boosting local household income. As a result, local housing demand may increase, which helps push up local housing prices. We test this channel by studying how county-level unemployment rate and growth in zip code level average household income respond to the increasing presence of institutional buyers and sellers in their local market. According to Table 8 , for building permits measured in the growth rates of either units or value, an increase in an area's institutional buyers increases the growth rate of the building permit. By contrast, an increase in the area's institutional sellers decreases the growth rate of building permits.
Overall between 2007 and 2014, changes in institutional shares of buyers and sellers contributed to between 18 and 20 percent of the growth in building permits measured in units or in value.
Turning to local labor market, on average, changes in institutions' presence as buyers in the local market decreases the local unemployment rate, while increasing shares of institutional sellers, on the other hand, increases local unemployment rate. Overall during our sample period, changes in institutional shares in the housing market contributed to about 6 percent of the changes in unemployment rates. Neither institutional presence, as buyer nor seller, aects the growth rate of the local average household income statistically signicantly.
Impact on the Local Rental Market
Although we do not observe institutional activities after they purchase the houses, the fact that The county eviction rates come from the Eviction Lab at Princeton University. The eviction rates, however, do not dierentiate between housing types and are for all housing in the county. These rates serve as a lowered bound as they do not capture informal evictions occurred outside the courtroom.
In Table 9 , we report our results. In terms of rent-price ratio, given our earlier result that institutional buyers raise local house price growth rates while institutional sellers lower local house price growth rates combined with the buy to let model which increases local rental housing supply, it is, therefore, not surprising that the growth rate in the local average rent-to-price ratio declines with increases in the share of institutional buyers but rises with increases in the share of institutional sellers. Overall, institutional investors' buy and sell explains 13 percent of the percentage changes in the rent-to-price ratio. The eect of institutional buyers is strongest in areas with medium housing supply elasticity. In high-foreclosure areas, however, the growth rate of rent-price ratio is not aected by the presence of institutional buyers or sellers. This implies that rents in these areas are not growing faster than house prices.
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23 Note that many institutions and individuals didn't buy and sell during our sample periods, so the average holding periods for either category in actuality are much longer than reported here.
24 Gete and Reher (2018) investigate whether tightening in local lending conditions leads to increases in local rents.
Turning to local eviction rates, our regression results are mixed. For the sample as a whole, we nd weak evidence of increases in institutional sellers raising local eviction rates. For sub-samples with medium housing supply elasticity or with high foreclosure results, we nd that increases in institutional buyers in the local housing market increase local eviction rates. Increases in institutional sellers, however, no longer raise local eviction rates for cities with medium supply elasticity and they lower local eviction rates in high foreclosure areas. Taking the results together, our analysis does not provide strong evidence that institutional landlords may be more ruthless in that they raise rents more and evict tenants more as depicted by the media. 25 
Conclusions
In this paper, using unique housing transaction data we document a rising trend of institutions as buyers and sellers in the single family housing market immediately following the mortgage crisis. This trend lasted well into 2014. We argue that this rising trend has led to a house price recovery without homeowners. Our empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in zip codes' exposure to regulatory shocks that aect lenders dierently, changes in FHFA conforming loan limits, as well capital gains tax rate.
Our main nding is that between 2007 and 2014, institutional investors as buyers have helped local house price recovery but depressed local homeownership rate while sellers have depressed local house price growth rates but helped with growth in the homeownership rate. Furthermore, these eects associated with institutional investors on house price growth are much stronger in areas with medium housing supply elasticity or areas with high foreclosure rates. We identify housing rehabilitation/renovation as well as improved labor market as the main transmitting mechanisms.
Institutional investors' buying and selling in the single family housing market also aected the local rental market, reducing the changes in the rent-to-price ratio, but had no consistent eect on eviction rates. C. The selection of the four MSAs is based on their diverse housing market conditions. Note that because we exclude nominal REO (real estate owned) sales and not all REO sales lead to foreclosure sales which we do include in our data, our foreclosure sales measurement understates the extent of housing distress in the economy. This table reports the housing market conditions of the 20 MSAs included in our study as characterized by real house price growth rate, homeownership rate, total transactions, and the foreclosure shares. The real house price growth rate is constructed using CoreLogic Solutions MSA level house price index for detached single family homes deated by headline CPI (consumer price index) from U.S. Census/Haver Analytics. (1) lagged weighted dierence between denial rates for loans made to lenders subject to stress test and to lenders not subject to stress test; (2) the lagged fraction of mortgage applications with loan amount exceeding 1.25 times of the conforming limit; and (3) the caital gains tax rate evaluated at the zip code average household income. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; and *** at 1 percent level. For our instruments, the underidenticaiton test rejects the hypothesis that the model is underidentied with a P-value of 0.000. The model also rejects the weak identication test at 5 percent critical level. The overidentication test gives a Sargan statistic that has a P-value of 0.04. This table presents some alternative Two-Stage Least Squares estimation results. The dependent variable is the real house price growth rate for the top panel and changes in homeownership rate for the bottom panel. Instrument 1: the weighted dierence in denial rates between banks subject to stress test and banks not subject to stress test; instrument 2: percentage of mortgage applications with loan amount exceeding 1.25 times of the county's conforming loan limit; instrument 3: the income tax rate for a household with mean income of the zip code. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; and *** at 1 percent level. Cities with medium elasticities refers to areas with housing elasticity ranked within the middle 50 percent of the sample and they include Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Las Vegas, Minneapolis, New York City, Portland, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington D.C. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; and *** at 1 percent level. Cities with medium elasticities refers to areas with housing elasticity ranked within the middle 50 percent of the sample and they include Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Las Vegas, Minneapolis, New York City, Portland, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington D.C. Foreclosure areas are zip codes that ranked at the top 25 percentile of the sampel in terms of foreclosure rates. All 20 cities are repsented in this subsample. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; and *** at 1 percent level. This table presents some alternative Two-Stage Least Squares estimation results. The dependent variable is the growth rate in building permits in units and in real value for the top panel, and changes in local unemployment rate and growth rate of average household income for the bottom panel. The permit and unemployment data are at the county level, while the household income data are at the zip code level. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; and *** at 1 percent level. This 
